We explore the effects of local ethnic and religious diversity on individual donations to private charities. Using 10-year neighborhood-level panels derived from personal tax records in Canada, we find that diversity has a detrimental effect on charitable donations. A 10 percentage point increase in ethnic diversity reduces donations by 14%, and a 10 percentage point increase in religious diversity reduces donations by 10%. The ethnic diversity effect is driven by a within-group disposition among non-minorities, and is most evident in high income, but low education areas. The religious diversity effect is driven by a within-group disposition among Catholics, and is concentrated in high income and high education areas. Despite these large effects on amount donated, we find no evidence that increasing diversity affects the fraction of households that donate. Over the period studied, ethnic diversity rises by 6 percentage points and religious diversity rises by 4 percentage points; our results suggest that charities receive about 12% less in total donations. As areas like North America continue to grow more diverse over time, our results imply that these demographic changes may have significant implications for the charitable sector. JEL Codes: H41, R23, J11 * We acknowledge funding from the University of Manitoba, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), and from the National Science Foundation.
I -Introduction
Diversity is increasingly a fact in urban centers across North America and Europe, and is often lauded as a virtue in and of itself. Recent research suggests, however, that despite other potential positive benefits, diversity appears to dilute support for publicly funded goods and services. Ethnically diverse communities appear to spend less on schools (Alesina, Baqir, Easterly, 1999 & 2000 Poterba, 1997 , Goldin & Katz, 1999 , less on roads and hospitals (Alesina, Baqir, Easterly, 1999 & 2000 , and to have lower Census form completion rates (Vigdor, 2004) . Does a decrease in support for publicly provided goods indicate a similar decline in private provision of public goods, like local charitable services? Using standard models of group affiliation (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) , the prediction is not clear. If people prefer to sort into social groups that are similar to themselves in terms of ethnicity, religion, or income, then increased diversity may mean that individuals are more likely to become increasingly willing to give to charitable causes that benefit their own group, such as local religious organizations or neighborhood food banks.
Alternatively, if the charities are seen as helping those outside their group, then the same insular feelings that lead to less support for publicly provided goods may pervade attitudes toward giving to private charities as well.
We study the effect of ethnic and religious diversity on individuals' donations to private charities. We use aggregated data on charitable donations derived from Canadian tax records linked to Census data over 10 year time periods. Canada is an ideal place to study questions about diversity.
First, Canada is one of the world's most diverse nations. It actively promotes multiculturalism and is more open to immigration than most developed nations. Second, the data from the charitable sector in Canada are perhaps the most complete and precise data on charitable organizations available, updated annually. Third, the Canadian Census is collected once every five years, information on ethnicity and religion is detailed, and data can be linked relatively easily over time. Moreover, the Census areas are relatively small. As a result, key information needed to study diversity is both more detailed and more frequently updated than data from other countries, like in the United States.
Our empirical model is based on Vigdor (2002 Vigdor ( , 2004 , where community-level regressions are an aggregated version of an individual-level model with donations modeled as a function of a person's own ethnic or religious group share of the population. The advantage of this approach is that we can make statements about average individual behavior even though we use aggregated data. Furthermore, as we show below it provides a natural motivation for using a Fragmentation Index (FI) to measure diversity. This measure is useful because it is widely used in the literature and also because it is easily interpreted as the probability that any two randomly-selected individuals in the community belong to different groups.
The average adult in our sample donates almost $200 per year. We find that increasing the ethnic FI by 10 percentage points reduces the average donation per adult by roughly $27 per year, a 14% reduction. By contrast, we find no statistically significant relationship between changes in the ethnic FI and the fraction of households that make a donation. Ethnic diversity appears, therefore, to affect the intensive rather than extensive margin. Looking deeper into which groups drive this effect, we find that non-minorities contribute roughly $92 more per adult when their group share increases by 10 percentage points in the community, and Blacks contribute $390 more for the same increase in their group share. By contrast, East Asians contribute $111 less per adult when their group share increases by 10 percentage points. Finally, the effects are strongest in high income and low education communities.
Turning to religious diversity, a 10 percentage point increase in the FI reduces contributions by about $20 per adult per year, a 10% reduction, though this estimate is noisy. Catholics increase their donations by $69 per adult when their share in the population rises by 10 percentage points. We again find no evidence that religious diversity affects the fraction of households that donate.
In sum, our results indicate that the deleterious effects of diversity on public sector provision of goods extends to privately provided public goods as well. Increases in ethnic and religious diversity lead to significant declines in charitable giving in the urban Canadian areas in our sample. Over the ten years of our study, ethnic diversity increased by six percentage points, and religious diversity by four percentage points. Our estimates would suggest that, due to the negative effects of diversity on giving, the charities we study receive twelve percent less in donations.
II -Existing Literature
Many studies on diversity focus on the relationship between diversity and the amount or distribution of public spending by governments or, more recently, on contributions or attitudes towards activities or goods that generate public benefits (See reviews by La Ferrara, 2005, Stichnoth and Van der Straeten, 2009 ). The main conclusion from the literature is that diversity reduces publicly provided goods, both across countries and across communities within a country (mainly the United States). Ethnically diverse communities are found to spend less on schools (Alesina, Baqir, Easterly, 1999 & 2000 Poterba, 1997 , Goldin & Katz, 1999 , less on roads (Alesina, Baqir, Easterly, 1999 & 2000 , and less on social programs in general as a fraction of GDP (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, 2001 ). One exception is that Cutler et al. (1993) find that changes in state-level demographic characteristics have a negative effect on public spending, but at the county level the effect is positive.
A related literature also finds that diversity has a negative impact on individual behavior when there are public benefits involved. In racially or ethnically heterogeneous communities, involvement in social activities is lower (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) , people are less likely to fill out census forms (Vigdor, 2004) , they contribute less to schools through voluntary fundraising events (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005) , and contribute less to community organizations (Okten and Osili, 2004) . There are several explanations offered for this effect. If different groups have different tastes or agendas for public spending, then this disagreement may make it more difficult to raise the funds necessary to provide those goods, and may make the goods themselves more costly 1 (such as multilingual education), and so overall provision is lower (Alesina et al. 1999) . Other researchers have suggested that individuals may be less willing to contribute to a good with public benefits if those benefits accrue to other groups besides their own. There may be mistrust across groups La Ferrara, 2002, Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001) or pro-social within-group norms that are not easily enforceable across groups (Habyarimana et al., 2007) .
Several studies focus specifically on the relationship between diversity and altruistic behavior.
Hungerman (2009) finds evidence that charitable spending by all-white church congregations is more sensitive to increases in the percent of the local community that is Black compared to more diverse congregations. In an interesting contrast, Hungerman (2008) finds that government spending on charities is less likely to crowd out charitable spending by United Methodist Churches in more ethnically diverse communities. Experimental evidence by Fong and Luttmer (2009) shows that giving to Hurricane Katrina victims is higher when the giver and recipient have the same racial background, but there is no effect of race on the decision to give. In a different experiment, Fong and Luttmer (2011) found that while non-Black participants view Black individuals as less worthy of charity, it did not translate into less giving.
III -Empirical Strategy
We are able to use our data to potentially draw shaper conclusions than prior studies. First, we are able to consider a broader set of charities than churches alone. Second, U.S.-based studies are limited by the racial categories available in the Census: Black, White, Hispanic, American Indian, and 1 A nice example from Jackson (2010) is a fragmented community where some individuals want to provide public education in one language, and other individuals want to provide it in another. It may be more costly to devise a system where education is delivered in multiple languages compared to a more homogeneous community that funds education in one language.
Asian/Pacific Islander. By contrast, the Canadian Census data have a broader set of groups available.
Third, Canada collects very comprehensive religious affiliation in the Census every 10 years, whereas U.S. Census data has no measure for religion.
Our empirical analysis is based on Vigdor (2002 Vigdor ( , 2004 , who builds a community-level model by aggregating an individual-level model. The main advantages of this exercise are that it provides a behavioral interpretation to the coefficients we get from the community-level model, and motivates the use of a Fragmentation Index (FI), which is the most common way to measure diversity.
Suppose that the amount individual i in group g from community c at time t donates to charity depends on the fraction of the community members who are in the same group:
where donation igct is an individual's donation to any charity in dollars, and share gct is the share of group g in the population in community c at time t. Vigdor (2002) Aggregating to the community-year level, we get
The overbars indicate community-level weighted averages at time t, where the weights are the group shares in the community. In the aggregate, community-level donations are a function of the shares and the squared shares, where the baseline and affinity effects are the coefficients on those shares. Use of the FI as a regressor is motivated by restricting all of the squared shares to have the same effect,
̅ ̅
The FI is 1 ∑ , so we can interpret -as the effect of increasing heterogeneity on donations. It measures the average effect of the individual squared shares. In practice, we estimate models with and without the restriction that the squared shares have the same effect. In the regressions where we restrict the coefficients on the squared shares to be the same we will use the FI as the main independent variable (rather than the sum of the squared shares) for interpretation purposes. Note that because aggregation creates heteroskedastic errors, we use standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the community level.
2
We control for the time varying factors in ̅ and using data from the Census on the variables most likely to be related to donations (discussed below). Additionally, we control for timeinvariant community factors in with a set of community-level fixed effects. Our identifying restrictions, therefore, are that the controls account for all time-varying factors that are related to both diversity and donations, and any remaining unobservable measures are controlled adequately through community-level fixed effects. For example there may be fundamental unobservable differences between neighborhoods in Toronto and Kitchener in terms of both their diversity and charitable nature that do not change over time; the fixed effects will control for these differences. One remaining issue for identification is sorting across neighborhoods. Since our use of community fixed effects should absorb most of the effects of sorting, we can maintain identification as long as there is no significant migration based on charitableness of communities during our sample period. In particular, if more charitable communities attract more diverse populations, then or estimates will be biased toward finding a positive relationship between diversity and donations. As we show later, this is a minor concern as the data does not suggest migration of this sort.
IV -Data
In this section we report the sources of our data, how we selected the sample for analysis, and provide summary statistics for the observations we analyze. basic population counts and gender from 100% of the population (the "short form"), and other more detailed information using a mandatory 20% sample (the "long form"). 8 Data on ethnic groups, collected through the long form, is based on an individual's "visible minority" status, which assigns people to one of twelve groups based mainly on skin tone. Because some groups are quite small, we regroup individuals into the following categories: Black, East/Southeast Asian, South Asian, Arab/West Asian, Latin American, Other, and not-visible-minority. 9 Religious groups, also collected on the long form, contain a much larger number of disaggregated categories, which we regroup for the same reasons into: Catholic, Christian (other than Catholic), Jewish, Muslim, Other, and not religious. We draw all of our control measures from the Census. These include household income, family structure, education, external and internal residential mobility, unemployment, population distribution, language, housing stock, house values, home ownership, and rent. All controls are listed in Table I .
IV.A -Data Description
Our data are aggregated to the FSA level, which is a relatively small geographic space used to delineate postal routes. An FSA is the first three characters of the 6-digit Canadian postal code, where the first identifies the province (in most cases) and the second identifies the area as urban or rural.
There are roughly 1,600 FSAs across Canada, and each is a relatively stable geographic area containing only 7,000 households on average. FSAs in rural locations tend to occupy large areas, while those in urban areas can be very small. Though they are generally stable, some FSAs do change boundaries over time. This occurs mostly where an urban FSA is created out of part of a rural FSA, but urban FSA are occasionally, though seldom, split into 2 or more urban FSAs. We refer to these as emerging FSAs.
Our solution to this was to regroup emerging FSAs back into their old boundaries, and use those boundaries for all years. A detailed explanation of this procedure is available in Appendix B. 
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IV.B -Sample
IV.C -Summary Statistics
In Table I In Table I , Panel B, we summarize Census information. Our key measure of diversity is the FI, which measures the probability that any two randomly selected individuals are in different groups. In 1996 there was on average a 22% chance of two people being from different visible minority groups, which climbs to 28% by 2006. There is much more diversity among religious groups: in 1991 there was a 53% chance on average that individuals belong to different religious groups, which rose to 57% by 2001. While the baseline level of diversity is much higher in terms of religion, growth in diversity is higher in terms of visible minority status.
We also present statistics showing changes over time in control measures that are related to diversity and donations. Some noteworthy changes are that average household income grows by roughly $5600, the fraction of the population who are immigrants grows by 4 percentage points, the fraction with a university education grows by 7 percentage points, and housing value grows by roughly $56,000.
In Table II we take a closer look at the distribution of donations and diversity. To help visualize diversity in Canada, Figure I shows the spatial distribution of ethnic diversity in the Golden Horseshoe (the populated area around Lake Ontario, including Toronto). In Table III we present data on the demographic shifts over time. Recall that the FI is the sum of the squared visible minority or religion shares. Panel A shows baseline shares in 1996 and the change in the shares over 10 years for visible minority groups. Clearly the largest group is non-visibleminorities with an 85.47% share. East/Southeast Asian is the next largest with 6.43%. South Asians 13 To save space we only present this Figure for ethnic diversity. Graphs for religious diversity are available upon request.
are roughly 3% of the population, Blacks are 2.6%, and other groups are smaller. We see donations are higher and more people donate in more ethnically diverse FSAs. A similar pattern is observed in columns 4-6, which separate the data by religious diversity. However, changes in means of the other variables across the quantiles suggest that this may not be a causal relationship, in particular because income is also higher in diverse neighborhoods. What is likely the case here is that more diverse neighborhoods are also the major urban centers like Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver, which will have more diverse and wealthier populations. We control for these factors in the regression analysis below.
V -Results
In next two subsections we first look at ethnic diversity, then religious diversity, both using the Fragmentation Index of diversity. In the third subsection we reconsider these results with a different index meant to capture concentration or polarization of communities.
V.A -Ethnic Diversity
In Table V we present regressions of average donations on diversity using various specifications that add increasing amounts of control variables, and then use squared shares instead of the FI. Column 1 is a simple OLS regression of donations on visible minority FI without controls (except year effects), which we use a baseline for comparison. As we saw in the summary statistics, there is a positive relationship between diversity and donations in this simple regression. The coefficient on FI measures the effect of moving from complete homogeneity (FI = 0) to complete heterogeneity (FI = 1). Column 2 adds a set of control variables from the Census; this changes the sign of the coefficient from positive to negative. Our preferred specification is in column 3, which adds FSA fixed effects to the control measures in the previous specification. Estimates from this specification imply that an increasing of 0.1 in the FI visible minority diversity measure lowers the average donation per adult by about $27 (that is, 271.02 times 0.1). This represents a 14 percent drop in average donations per adult, which we consider to be a substantial effect. To put this into perspective between 1996 and 2006 ethnic diversity in Canada increased by 0.06 points, which our results suggests lowered giving in urban areas by eight percent.
In column 4, we generalize the specification to allow the squared shares to enter separately into the regression. These coefficients are interpreted as the change in a particular group's willingness to donate when the share of its own group in the population increases from zero to 100%. Identifying the squared shares separately is more difficult when using fixed effects since, as the summary statistics suggested, they do not vary substantially over time. For this reason, few of these coefficients are statistically significant. Two notable exceptions are that an increase of 10 percentage points in the share of non-minorities increases donations by $111 for this group, and a 10-point increase in the share Black increases donations by $390. 14 On the other hand, other visible minority groups display group aversion. A 10 percentage point increase in the East Asian group reduces donations by roughly $111.
Others are not statistically significant. Therefore, while the result from column 3 suggests that on average groups are more willing to donate when their group share rises, not all groups display the same pattern.
In columns 5 and 6 we check the robustness of our results to the linear interpolation between Values in other years are interpolated. When we restrict the sample to only years when the Census data are observed, we get very similar results, though less statistically significant in general. We are thus confident that our results are not driven by the linear interpolation procedure.
Digging deeper into what might be driving the diversity effect, in Table VI we break the sample into quantiles based on household income and university education then analyze those subsamples separately. Columns 1 to 3 show that while the diversity effect is negative for all income quantiles, the strongest effect occurs in the richest FSAs, though these results are not statistically significant. 15 Table   VI also reports on subsamples of the data based on the fraction of individuals in the FSA with a university education. We see that the effect is highest in communities where university education is low.
Tables VII and VIII repeat the previous two tables using the fraction of households that donate as the dependent variable. In Table VII , our preferred specification is column 3, which reports 14 While the coefficient on share Black appears large relative to the overall mean donation, it would be more appropriate to compare to the mean among Black individuals in the sample. Due to the aggregated nature of our data, we are not able to compute the average donation among Black individuals in the sample. Thus, it is unclear whether this coefficient is large or small. 15 There are several possible explanations for this. The first is simply that wealthy individuals donate more to charity and are more likely to give, which creates greater ability to reduce giving.
coefficients from regressions of fraction of households who donate on the visible minority FI, a set of Census controls, year effects, and FSA fixed effects. Here we find no statistically significant effect.
Breaking out the FI into squared shares, we see that a 10 percentage point increase in the Black share increases probability of donation by about 18 percentage points, and a 10 percentage point increase in the Other share increases probability of donation by about 81 percentage points. Other coefficients are statistically insignificant. Overall, the results indicate that on average, charitable giving is sensitive to the demographic composition of the community. We find evidence that the propensity to donate and the amount of the donation are sensitive to the ethnic makeup of the community, though not all groups are sensitive in the same way. Indeed, some groups actually donate less when their group share increases. On average, however, the population does show group affinity. we find that Catholics have a statistically significant positive group affinity. Though none of the coefficients on other groups are statistically significant, some are positive and some are negative.
V.B -Religious Diversity
16
In Table IX we also report that the fraction of households who donate is relatively insensitive to religious fragmentation. In specifications that use squared group shares separately, we find that a 0.1 increase in the non-religious population leads to a 15.2 percentage point drop in non-religious household donations, and a similar increase the fraction of Others lowers Other household donations by 7 percentage points. A 0.1 increase in the share Christian, on the other hand, decreases donations by 6 percentage points. Again, not all others display a group affinity, but on average the increasing diversity reduces the fraction of households who donate by a small amount.
In Table X , we break up the sample by income and education quantiles and estimate models with donations per adult as the dependent variable. Though coefficients are generally not significant, the pattern is that more high income and high education neighborhoods have stronger responses to increased religious diversity. In Table XI we find no real evidence that the diversity effect varies across income and education groups.
To this point we have estimated the effect of ethnic and religious diversity in separate specifications, the primary reason being data limitations. To the extent that these two measures are correlated, part of the observed effect of ethnic diversity may actually be a religious effect, and vice versa. To explore this possibility, in Table XII we estimate specifications with both measures of diversity. For this exercise we use only data from 1996-2001, the time period when both visible minority and religion data are available. In columns 1 and 2 we use the new sample to estimate our preferred fixed effects specification with ethnic and religious diversity entering separately, for 16 We also generated estimates based on two alternative groupings of religions. In the first, we simply joined Catholics with the Christian group. In the second, we decompose Christians into finer groups, and also regroup the other religions. Results and descriptions of the new groups are in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2. The coefficient on FI remains negative, but the magnitude is stronger when Catholics are grouped with Christians.
comparison purposes. In column 3, we include both diversity measures in the regression. When both are included, we find that a 0.1 unit increase in ethnic diversity reduces donations by $48, whereas a 0.1 unit increase in religious diversity reduces donations by $11, though the latter is not statistically significant. Comparing to columns 1 and 2, we see that the ethnic diversity coefficient is higher, but the religion coefficient is significantly smaller in magnitude. Thus, while the effect of each measure on donations partly reflects the effect of the other, each continues to exert an independent effect on donations.
V.C -Diversity or Polarization?
While our model motivates our use of the FI, we estimate models with an alternative measure of community diversity frequently found in the literature called the RQ index (Montalvo & ReynalQuerol, 2002) , which is defined as:
.
Whereas the FI measures fragmentation, RQ measures polarization. The difference is best illustrated by example. Suppose there are three ethnic groups in the population. FI takes a maximum when the population is divided equally among the groups, whereas RQ takes a maximum when the population is divided equally among only two of the groups. The distinction between fractionalization and polarization could prove important if it is really two opposing groups that matter, rather than diversity spread over many groups.
Despite the differences in interpretation, both measures are highly correlated at low values of the FI, not correlated at middle values, and negatively correlated at high values. Thus, relatively homogenous societies that become more diverse also initially become more polarized, but highly diverse societies that become more diverse can become less polarized.
The results of regressions with the RQ index are presented in is not in the same scale as the FI, so the coefficients are not directly comparable. Nevertheless, the effect is in the same direction, which is not surprising because at low levels of the FI, the two measures are highly correlated. Similar to prior results, polarization does not have a statistically significant effect on the fraction of households who donate.
In Panel B, we show that an increase in religious polarization by 0.1 reduces donations by $13.
By contrast, more polarized communities are estimated to increase the probability of donation slightly.
A 0.1 increase in the RQ index increases the fraction of households who donate by 1 percentage point.
This result is in direct contrast to the regressions using FI, but are not surprising since at high values of the FI the two measures are negatively correlated. A more polarized community in this case is a less fragmented one, so to the extent that it is fragmentation that matters, the opposite sign is expected.
VII -Conclusion
In this paper we examine the relationship between ethnic diversity, religious diversity, and charitable donations. Previous literature has shown that publicly provided goods can be lower in jurisdictions that are more heterogeneous along these dimensions. Our results confirm this finding in the case of privately provided public goods, in particular private charity. We find that the average donation per adult in our sample drops by $27 per year when the ethnic FI increases by 0.1 points. This adds up to a substantial drop in the level of this public good. This effect is mainly driven by nonminorities, who contribute $9 less for each percentage point their group share drops, and Blacks, who contribute $39 less. The average effect of ethnic diversity on donations occurs most strongly in high income, and in low education neighborhoods. We find no evidence that ethnic diversity affects donations per household on average. significant evidence that Catholics are more willing to donate when their group share rises in the population. The effect of religious diversity on donations per adult is highest in high income and highly educated neighborhoods, though these estimates are less precise than the estimates based on ethnic diversity.
Our results imply that the recent and continuing demographic changes across North America and Europe may have a significant and sizable impact on charitable services provided through voluntary contributions of individuals. As communities grow more diverse, charity revenues may fall.
This raises further public policy concerns, especially in urban areas, as religious and ethnic diversity inevitably grow. 22.23% Notes: Names of visible minority and religious groups are the names given in the Canada Census. The first column is the population share for a particular group, and the second column is the change in the share over 10 years. There is no data on visible minorities in 1991, and no data on religion in 1996 or 2006. Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level; bold-italic coefficients are significant at the 10% level. Full sample includes data from all years 1996-2006, including linearly interpolated census data between years. Census years includes data from 1996, 2001, and 2006 only. Visible minority shares were demeaned prior to estimation, so the coefficients are interpreted as the effect of increasing the share on donations when the share is at its mean. F is the F-statistic of overall significance of the model. Census controls are all variables listed in the previous tables. Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level; bold-italic coefficients are significant at the 10% level. Income and Education terciles are based on 2001 data, and applied to all years. Income terciles are based on average household income, education terciles are based on the fraction of individuals with a university degree. Visible minority shares were demeaned prior to estimation, so the coefficients are interpreted as the effect of increaseing the share on donations when the share is at its mean. F is the F-statistic of overall significance of the model. Census controls are all variables listed in the previous tables. 1996, 2001, and 2006 only. Visible minority shares were demeaned prior to estimation, so the coefficients are interpreted as the effect of increasing the share on donations when the share is at its mean. F is the F-statistic of overall significance of the model. Census controls are all variables listed in the previous tables. Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level; bold-italic coefficients are significant at the 10% level. Income and Education terciles are based on 2001 data, and applied to all years. Income terciles are based on average household income, education terciles are based on the fraction of individuals with a university degree. Visible minority shares were demeaned prior to estimation, so the coefficients are interpreted as the effect of increaseing the share on donations when the share is at its mean. F is the F-statistic of overall significance of the model. Census controls are all variables listed in the previous tables. Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level, and bold-italic coefficients are significant at the 10% level. Religion shares were demeaned prior to estimation, so the coefficients are interpreted as the effect of increasing the share on donations when the share is at its mean. F is the F-statistic of overall significance of the model. Census controls are all variables listed in the previous tables. are significant at the 5% level, and bold-italic coefficient are significant at the 10% level. Income and Education terciles are based on 2001 data, and applied to all years. Income terciles are based on average household income, education terciles are based on the fraction of indiiduals with a university degree. Religion shares were demeaned prior to esimation, so the coefficients are interpreted as the effect of increasing the share on donations when the share is at its mean. F is the F-statistic of overall significance of the model. Census controls are all variables listed in the previous tables. are significant at the 5% level, and bold-italic coefficients are significant at the 10% level. Income and Education terciles are based on 2001 data, and applied to all years. Income terciles are based on average household income, education terciles are based on the fraction of indiiduals with a university degree. Religion shares were demeaned prior to esimation, so the coefficients are interpreted as the effect of increasing the share on donations when the share is at its mean. F is the F-statistic of overall significance of the model. Census controls are all variables listed in the previous tables. Regression contains data from 1996-2001, the overlapping years of religion and visible minority data. Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level, and bold-italic coefficients are significant at the 10% level. Religion and Visible Minority shares were demeaned prior to estimation, so the coefficients are interpreted as the effect of increasing the share on donations when the share is at its mean. F is the F-statistic of overall significance of the model. Census controls are all variables listed in the previous tables. Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level, and bold-italic coefficients are significant at the 10% level. RQ is a measure of polarization of groups, as discussed in Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2002) . Religion and Visible Minority Shares were demeaned prior to estimation, so the coefficients are interpreted as the efect of increasing the share on donations when the share is at its mean. F is the F-statistic of overall significance of the model. Census controls are all variables listed in the previous tables. Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level, and bold-italic coefficients are significant at the 10% level. Religion shares were demeaned prior to estimation, so the coefficients are interpreted as the effect of increasing the share on donations when the share is at its mean. F is the F-statistic of overall significance of the model. Census controls are all variables listed in the previous tables. In this Table, Christian = Catholic, United, Anglican, Presbyterian, Baptist, Lutheran, Orthodox, Pentecostal, Jehovah's Witness, Mennonite, Reform, Mormon, Salvation Army, Other Christian; Other = Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Other. Remaining categories are singularly defined. 
